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Abstract
Background: As patients often see the data of their medical histories scattered among various medical records
hosted in several health-care establishments, the purpose of our multidisciplinary study was to define a pragmatic
and secure on-demand based system able to gather this information, with no risk of breaching confidentiality, and
to relay it to a medical professional who asked for the information via a specific search engine.
Methods: Scattered data are often heterogeneous, which makes the task of gathering information very hard. Two
methods can be compared: trying to solve the problem by standardizing and centralizing all the information about
every patient in a single Medical Record system or trying to use the data “as is” and find a way to obtain the most
complete and the most accurate information. Given the failure of the first approach, due to the lack of
standardization or privacy and security problems, for example, we propose an alternative that relies on the current
state of affairs: an on-demand system, using a specific search engine that is able to retrieve information from the
different medical records of a single patient.
Results: We describe the function of Medical Record Search Engines (MRSE), which are able to retrieve all the
available information regarding a patient who has been hospitalized in different hospitals and to provide this
information to health professionals upon request. MRSEs use pseudonymized patient identities and thus never
have access to the patient’s identity. However, though the system would be easy to implement as it by-passes
many of the difficulties associated with a centralized architecture, the health professional would have to validate
the information, i.e. read all of the information and create his own synthesis and possibly reject extra data, which
could be a drawback. We thus propose various feasible improvements, based on the implementation of several
tools in our on-demand based system.
Conclusions: A system that gathers all of the currently available information regarding a patient on the request of
health-care professionals could be of great interest. This low-cost pragmatic alternative to centralized medical
records could be developed quickly and easily. It could also be designed to include extra features and should thus
be considered by health authorities.
Background
Setting up an effective secure way to share information
embedded in medical records between the different Health
Structures (HS) involved in patients’ care would greatly
improve the quality of health care. This assertion is one of
the main reasons for the development of Electronic Medi-
cal Records (EMR) over the last three decades. However,
though the desire to provide professionals with access to
all of the information related to patients is almost univer-
sally shared, in order to implement an effective system var-
ious difficulties have to be foreseen and overcome. This
can be done early during the elaboration, since two archi-
tectural options can be compared: a single centralized,
systematized, secure EMR system used by all Health Struc-
tures and including every patient, vs. a pragmatic secure
system, able to retrieve information from the current non-
centralized, non-standardized, non-structured EMRs and,
most of all, only when needed and only for a particular
request, i.e. an “on-demand” system.
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The choice of approach depends on various criteria
such as health care policies, governments’ willingness,
social and political context, etc. First of all, we are not
aware of a country that has successfully implemented a
standardized, centralized, secured, privacy-compliant
and reliable EMR system. This is one of the many rea-
sons why we have chosen to promote a non-centralized,
non-standardized, on-demand system that relies on one
main concept: to search for and retrieve distributed het-
erogeneous medical data. This approach is very close to
what was proposed by Maro [1], and what is already
effective in Israel (Clalit HMO and government hospi-
tals), Pittsburgh (Pennsylvania - UPMC) [2] and is being
implemented in Brussels (IRIS hospitals) [3] and
Franche Comte, France (EMOSYST) [4].
We present below other reasons for this choice, and
we aim to go further and propose in the methods sec-
tion a practical and technical description of a system
that overcomes many of the usual problems, especially
the lack of standardization.
Bottlenecks encountered in centralized systems
Centralization needs standardization, and standardization
has needs
First of all, when no standard is available, it can be very
difficult to create one. In many countries, harmonization
of patients’ identities is very difficult to achieve, and old
previously stored medical data have to be re-indexed.
The French concept of a Unique Patient Identifier (UPI)
will effectively resolve this problem, but it is still in the
initial deployment phase [5,6]. Furthermore, this UPI
only concerns French nationals and other countries’
initiatives, where they exist, would not use the same stan-
dards. In the face of such difficulties, the current strategy
at the European level is to let each country define its own
identification policy and to encourage interoperability
between national information systems. Thus, a pragmatic
solution that relies on data such as first name, last name
and date of birth, which are present in all EMRs and does
not require a UPI seems to be more appropriate and
easier to achieve.
Moreover, besides patient identity, standardization also
concerns many other fields and data harmonization of all
health records at the national level can be difficult to
achieve [7].
But the lack of standardization is not the only problem;
even when the tools exist, they are not necessarily used.
Regarding the standardization and structuring of the
EMR system, a lot of time has been wasted trying to
define a unique format for all doctors and all pathologies.
The only domain where real harmonization has been
obtained is “coding” - which is used to assess hospital
activities, using the Systematized Nomenclature of Medi-
cal and clinical terms (SNOMED), and the International
Classification of Diseases (ICD). However, though these
terminologies are widely accepted and are now included
in EMRs to record the activities of health-care facilities,
they are not actually used for the daily management of
patients’ records in all European countries. The same
applies to patients’ drug treatments, which are key infor-
mation, and for which there is the International Common
Denomination (ICoD) used widely by the pharmaceutical
industry, but which is still not used in a large number of
prescriptions in countries where branded drugs are the
most “popular”.
The risks of centralization
The risks related to centralized records can be summar-
ized as vulnerability and access management difficulties.
For many years, the authorities have understood the risk
of losing all of the data of a centralized system if the sys-
tem is destroyed. Among other things, this conclusion led
the US Department of Defense to create in 1969 the
ARPANET, a network system that would be able to
remain functional in case of a catastrophe. Regarding
health data, the same approach can be applied and it
would be obviously much safer to store such data in differ-
ent places to ensure the protection of information, as it
could be, for example, a target for terrorists who wish to
destabilize a country by destroying or by pirating its health
system and by divulging health information on citizens.
Furthermore, hackers may see a centralized system as a
challenge and try to gain access to a centralized patient
EMR system and modify patients’ medical information.
One could argue that centralized systems may appear
easier to protect [8], by involving a team of security specia-
lists devoted to implementing and enforcing security stra-
tegies for the entire structure, unified under a common set
of principles. As an objection, it could be said that read/
write access rights can be set up more easily [9,10] at the
local level, e.g. by disabling write permission for all incom-
ing connections from outside the local network.
Finally, to maintain the completeness of the EMR,
every single actor has to be connected to the centralized
system to notify it of every single operation he makes.
Regarding the case of drug prescriptions, for example,
the regulation of traffic load and security could be very
difficult to manage.
In addition, to be effective, this kind of infrastructure
requires a systematic process for every patient, without
discrimination.
On-Demand based Aggregation System: a true alternative
As centralized systems seem to be hard to build, to main-
tain and to protect, they cannot be an effective secure
way to share information in the near future. In contrast,
decentralized systems seem to be more flexible [1].
In our opinion, it seems feasible to set up a system
that allows each doctor, with the authorization of the
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patient, to collect information on that patient from the
different HS. Once the doctor has obtained the medical
information via his medical information exchange appli-
cation, he will have to synthesize the patient’s medical
history for his specific use, save it, and update it
regularly.
The basic organizational advantage is that it could be
operational rapidly, provided that problems of harmo-
nization are reduced. The principle of decentralized
management requires that the saved EMRs in the var-
ious HS remain in their unmodified state in terms of
content and structure. Even though the data are not
standardized, several items or fields such as first name,
last name and date of birth exist in each patient ’s
EMR, regardless of the rest of information. Identifying
and picking a specific EMR using such data can thus
be considered safe and does not require any additional
indexing.
The second benefit is that this job has to be done only
when needed, which means, first, that the workload will
be distributed among health professionals and then that
the task will only be necessary if a health-care profes-
sional requires information.
With this in mind, we propose a system that stems
from our previous work on Medical Search Engines
(MRSEs), which are able to aggregate Patients’ Health
Information on-demand.
A practical solution describing the flow of information
and how the system can achieve its task in a secure,
privacy-compliant way is explained below.
Methods
General description of the Medical Record Search Engine
system
When a patient and his/her doctor want to gain access
to the patient’s medical data, scattered among the ser-
vers of various hospitals or clinics, they first have to
connect to an electronic server and identify themselves.
The identification of the doctor should be based on
strong authentication credentials. Typically, the doctor
might use a token activated with a PIN code (or with
biometrics) to give the answer in a challenge-response
protocol. The identification of the patient could be
based on a smartcard (E-health card) for example. Once
the authorization is granted, Medical Record Search
Engines (MRSE) will securely gather medical informa-
tion about the patient in a privacy-compliant way and
transfer it to the Medical Practitioner (MP).
Two main points are considered. First, all of the
retrieved information will be gathered by the hospital’s
system before being transferred to the MP’s office, i.e. the
management system requests information without
directly reading the provider’s local information. More
clearly, all EMRs are kept and managed in a decentralized
way in the “local” HS, recorded according to the system
provided by the health structure’s software and identified
with the usual identifiers (first name, last name and birth
date) which are present in all EMRs. Secondly, the
patient’s privacy is protected by using a pseudonymous
code (derived from the patient’s identity). All communi-
cations are encrypted.
Entire routine procedure
To gain access to a patient’s medical records, the pro-
posed procedure can be described in seven steps (cf.
Figure 1).
First step: Pseudonymization of patient’s identity
During a consultation between a MP and a patient, the
MP enters all the components of that patient’s identifi-
cation. This information related to the patient’s identity
will be “anonymized”, using a robust cryptographic hash
function to provide a Hashed Patient Identity called H
(PI). The aim of this algorithm is to obtain a pseudon-
ymous code, but, hopefully, always the same one for a
given individual in order to link all of the information
concerning any given patient.
Second step: Sending the request to the two MRSEs
When a MP wants to request a patient’s information
scattered in other HS, he has to send a request to two
MRSEs and authenticate both himself and the patient.
Exchanges between the MP and the MRSEs are pro-
tected by using an asymmetric encryption algorithm
(like the RSA encryption). In this communication, the
public keys (PMRE1 and PMRE2) of the MRSEs are used
by the MP.
The MP sends a request called “x” to the two Medical
Record Search Engines MRSE1 and MRSE2. The system
hinges on the prevention of communication between
MRSE1 and MRSE2. As seen in Figure 1, the informa-
tion sent by the MP is split between the MRSEs. The
purpose of MRSE1 and MRSE2 is to guarantee the con-
fidentiality and the privacy of the request during its
transmission.
MRSE1 receives three elements:
a) x, the number of the request,
b) K, a session key,
c) ej, the MP public key.
MRSE2 receives two elements:
a) x, the number of the request,
b) EK(H(PI)), the hashed patient identity H(PI), pre-
viously symmetrically encrypted by the MP with the
session key K.
Through this procedure, MRSE2 is unable to access
the pseudonymous patient identifier as it does not know
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the session key K, which has been transmitted to
MRSE1. This prevents MRSE2 from finding the identity
of the patient through, for example, a dictionary attack.
In order to preserve patient’s privacy, MRSE1 and
MRSE2 are not able to communicate with each other.
Third step: Request transmitted to all HS by the two MRSE’s
To transmit the request to the hospitals, both MRSEs
first have to decrypt the messages sent by the MP, using
their own private keys.
Then MRSE1 and MRSE2 consult an HS’ directory in
order to forward the request to all HS to which they are
connected. MRSE1 and MRSE2 sign their respective
part and send it to the hospitals. The requested infor-
mation is encrypted with the HS’ public keys.
Fourth step: Search for the patient’s EMR at the HS’ level
Locally, each HS decrypts messages issued by MRSEs.
Then, they also decrypt the pseudonymous patient iden-
tifier (H(PI)) with the session key K.
Each hospital ‘hi’ can then search for medical records
corresponding to this pseudonym (comparing it with
hashed identities of the patients hospitalized in hi). If this
search is successful, i.e. if one corresponds to the pre-
viously received H (PI), the corresponding patient’s EMR
will be gathered before being sent to the aggregator.
Fifth step: Transfer of the results of the request to an
aggregator
This step consists in sending to an aggregator a record
containing three elements:
a) the number of the request, x
b) the hashed patient identity, H(PI)
c) the patient’s EMR, digitally signed by hospital hi
with an electronic signature.
This electronic signature allows non repudiation and
verification of the integrity of the message. To ensure
transmission security, confidential medical information
such as the hashed patient identity H(PI) and the
patient’s EMR are asymmetrically encrypted with the
MP public key ej. The MP is the only one who can
MP 
ej : MP’s public key
IdMP : MP’s identity
(x, K, ej)
…
(x, K, ej)hi
Patient
H(PI)
MRSE1
x, EK (H(PI))
…
(x, EK (H(PI))hi
Hospital
PKI 
directory
MRSE2
x, E(MR, H(PI))ej
...
E(x, K, ej)PMRSE1
X, IdMP
Aggregator
E(x, EK(H(PI)))PMRSE2
x, K, ej x, EK (H(PI))
x, H(PI), ej
x, MR, H(PI), ej
E[x, E (MR, H(PI))ej]PA
Hospital i
hi
E(x, K, ej)Phi E(x, EK(H(PI)))Phi
Hospital PKI
directory
Figure 1 Medical Record Search Engines’ Procedure.
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decrypt this confidential medical information with his
private key.
Sixth step: Gathering all patient information at the
aggregator level
The aggregator collects information received from all
HS and gathers all the results of the same request x.
These results are sent to the MP, after a challenge-
response authentication procedure. The MP will be then
able to decrypt these results with his own private key.
Discussion
Regarding security, MRSEs are platforms that never have
direct access to the database of the local systems of the
HS as it is the HS itself which makes the requests: the
on-demand system could not be used to alter or destroy
local information.
Regarding privacy, MRSEs are platforms where
encrypted information is temporarily stored before
being passed on. MRSEs do not store any EMRs but
may keep logs of transactions. Furthermore, MRSE1
does not manage patient data, and MRSE2 only manages
pseudoanonymous encrypted data. Hence, we also pro-
pose that MRSE1 and MRSE2 are not allowed to com-
municate with each other, and that they must be hosted
in different locations under different responsibilities to
ensure privacy.
Regarding feasibility, as the system relies on « as is »
data, no modifications, especially no standardization, is
needed. Although the absence of a need for a new
unique identifier is a major advantage, it may raise some
discussion about doubloons and collision risks.
Regarding doubloon risk (i.e. losing some information
by not being able to link information concerning the
same patient) it is, most of the time, due to a typo, and
it is important to understand that the problem remains
even in local EMR. However, in the on-demand MRSE
system, it is possible to reduce such errors by imple-
menting tools using phonetic algorithms as described in
a previous papers [11] or other robust transformations
like in [12] or in [13]. To improve linkage quality, it is
also possible to envisage that the MP sends not only
one pseudonymous identifier per patient but a list of
pseudonymous partial identifiers for each patient. The
creation of each pseudonymous partial identifier can be
based on the different combinations of first names, last
names and dates of birth. This could be very helpful in
various situations, such as in patients with two last
names (e.g. married women or a child of divorced par-
ents), or a patient who has two first names (e.g. “David
Roger” or “John Paul”).
Regarding collision risk, (i.e. mixing two EMRs from
two different patients), although it is also related to
EMR information and not the on-demand system, it
implies that the MP has to check all information,
eventually with the help of the patient. However, a feasi-
bility test-based tool, relying on observed data and prob-
abilistic modeling, could be implemented in our system
involving MRSEs. For each record, this tool could man-
age a linkage probability level (high, medium or low),
and the centralized aggregator, when transmitting the
results of the request, could give a hierarchical order
with high, medium or low probability levels, so as to
help the MP in the validation process.
Also regarding the ease of use, as previously men-
tioned, the extra work would be distributed between the
different Health Professionals, according to needs. In
other words, the system will gradually develop, little by
little, and rather effortlessly compared with a centralized
EMR systems. Furthermore, this recursive aspect of the
on-demand system means that it is ready for use now.
Some MPs may complain that they will have to read
all of the different information to detect possibly false
or missing information. Several counter arguments can
be put forward.
First, since embedded information in the EMRs is
enough for most of the needs of health professionals,
gathering scattered information on a patient is, for rou-
tine care purposes, rarely necessary. Secondly, an enquiry
on a patient’s medical history is not necessary in the vast
majority of cases. Thirdly, it has to be done only once
(unless the patient frequently seeks treatment in different
places, which is rare) and just needs regular updates.
Finally, a doctor can, with the patient’s consent, pass on
gathered information to other doctors when this patient
moves.
Furthermore, only a few patients (but it should be
estimated in a survey) have been hospitalized in many
different hospitals, and therefore, the number of differ-
ent EMRs that MPs will have to summarize, consecutive
to one request, will be one or two rather than ten or
twenty.
Nevertheless, it is important to take into account that
this synthesis has to be done in collaboration with the
patient, who could provide great help in the manage-
ment of his own records. For example, regarding the
doubloon risk i.e. the risk of losing information, it is
easy to ask the patient if he has been hospitalized in
another place than at the hospitals that answered the
request and provided the information. Similarly, regard-
ing the risk of collision, (the amalgamation of two or
more EMRs from different patients), it is usually easy,
except in emergency situations, to ask the patient if he
has really been hospitalized at all the hospitals that
answered. The situation is less easy if the records pro-
vided came from the same hospitals, but here again the
patient should be able to say if the date of the stay and
the disease recorded correspond to him or not. Further-
more, the hierarchical classification proposed, based on
Quantin et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2011, 11:18
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/11/18
Page 5 of 6
probability levels could help to clear up this kind of
situation.
Regarding the efficiency, it could be useful to reduce
the amount of data gathered, in order to make it easier
to handle. Therefore, we planned to add a selection cri-
teria tool to the basic request as in any kind of search
engine. The criteria could relate to a time period, a list
of hospitals, a clinical department, a clinical event, the
pathology about which the MP requests precise infor-
mation, etc. However, the information, even when
reduced in quantity, will need to be analyzed and reor-
ganized by the practitioner.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed the interest of a prag-
matic solution to gather information about a patient’s
history that could be operational in the present context
of information storage. Thus, we propose a data-secure,
on-demand system that retrieves and aggregates informa-
tion using Medical Record Search Engines, which could
be a real alternative to centralized EMR management.
Then, as it would be much less expensive and avoid the
need for major reorganization of any kind of the medical
archives, it offers a concrete solution that is ready for use
and easy to set up in a short time. Furthermore, the
implementation of various tools to improve the ease of
use and the efficiency of the on-demand system has also
been discussed.
A regional level could be the right level to set up an
experiment to test this proposal.
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